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ABSTRACT: Chisholm v. Georgia was the first great constitutional case decided by
the Supreme Court. In Chisholm, the Court addressed the fundamental question:
Who is Sovereign? The People or the State? It adopted an individual concept of
popular sovereignty rather than the modern view that limits popular sovereignty
to collective or democratic self-government. It denied that the State of Georgia
was a sovereign entitled, like the King of England, to assert immunity from a
lawsuit brought by a private citizen. Despite all this, Chisholm is not among the
canon of cases that all law students are taught. Why not? In this essay, I offer
several reasons: Constitutional law is taught by doctrine rather than
chronologically; law professors have reason to privilege the Marshall Court; and
the Court’s individualist view of popular sovereignty is thought to have been
repudiated by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. I explain why the
Eleventh Amendment did not repudiate the view of sovereignty expressed in
Chisholm by comparing the wording of the Eleventh with that of the Ninth
Amendment, and conclude by suggesting another reason why Chisholm is not in
the canon: Law professors follow the lead of the Supreme Court and, like the
Ninth Amendment, the Supreme Court has deemed its first great decision too
radical in its implications.
Constitutional law professors know two things that their students often do
not: John Marshall was not the first Chief Justice of the United States, and
Marbury v. Madison1 was not the first great constitutional case decided by the
Supreme Court. That honor goes to Chisholm v. Georgia,2 decided some ten
years earlier when John Jay was Chief Justice. Students may be unaware of these
facts because most basic courses in constitutional law begin with Marbury, which,
along with Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 and Gibbons v.
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Ogden,4 are the earliest cases that are emphasized. The opinions in Chisholm are
never read; at most, the case is mentioned in passing to explain the origin of the
Eleventh Amendment that reversed its holding.
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court on a vote of four to one rejected the
assertion by Georgia of sovereign immunity as a defense against a suit in federal
court for breach of contract brought against it by a citizen of another state. The
fundamentality of the issue presented by the case was aptly characterized by
Justice Wilson:
This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a State;
certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined
is, whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States? This
question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important still; and,
may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than this “do the
5
people of the United States form a Nation?”

In Chisholm, the Justices of the Supreme Court rejected Geogia’s claim to
be sovereign. They concluded instead that, to the extent the term “sovereignty” is
even appropriately applied to the newly-adopted Constitution, it rests with the
people, rather than with state governments. Their decision is inconsistent with the
modern concept of popular sovereignty that views democratically-elected
legislatures as exercising the sovereign will of the people, or the modern claim
that states are entitled to the same immunity as was enjoyed by the King of
England. The Justices in Chisholm affirmed that, in America, the states are not
kings, and their legislatures are not the supreme successors to the Crown.
I. WHY WE SHOULD TEACH CHISHOLM
The judicial opinions in Chisholm are interesting for several reasons. To
begin with, the opinions exemplify the early reliance by the courts on first
principles, or what Wilson referred to as “general principles of right”6 and only
secondarily on text. Chisholm is typical in this regard. This is not to claim that
courts ever countenanced using first principles to ignore or contradict a pertinent
text. Rather, Chisholm well illustrates how first principles were used to interpret
4
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the meaning of the text in Article III, section 2 that reads: “The judicial power of
the United States shall extend to . . . controversies, between a state and citizens of
another State,” against the assertion that this text must be qualified by an extratextual unwritten “first principle” known as sovereign immunity. Georgia’s extratextual claim of sovereign immunity placed the issue squarely before the Court.
Justice Wilson began his analysis of this claim by contesting the
appropriateness of the very term “sovereignty” with regard to the new
Constitution:
To the Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is totally unknown.
There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety. But, even
in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those,
who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced
themselves “Sovereign” people of the United States: But serenely conscious of
7
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.

Wilson then identified possible alternative meanings of the term
“sovereign.” First, “the term sovereign has for its correlative, subject[.] In this
sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the Constitution
of the United States. Under that Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects.”8
Indeed, Wilson noted that the “term, subject, occurs, indeed, once in the
instrument; but to mark the contrast strongly, the epithet “foreign” is prefixed.”9
Wilson rejected this concept as inapplicable to states because he knew “the
Government of that State to be republican; and my short definition of such a
Government is, one constructed on this principle, that the Supreme Power resides
in the body of the people.”10 Furthermore,
the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a
part of the “People of the United States,” did not surrender the Supreme or
Sovereign Power to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to
themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a
11
sovereign State.
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In other words, according to Wilson, to the extent one wishes to use the word
“sovereignty” at all, sovereignty lies in the people themselves, not in any
government formed by the people.
Wilson then considered another sense of sovereignty that relates it to the
feudal power of English kings. “Into England this system was introduced by the
conqueror: and to this era we may, probably, refer the English maxim, that the
King or sovereign is the fountain of Justice. . . . With regard to him, there was no
superior power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no right of
jurisdiction.”12 Wilson characterized this as “only a branch of a much more
extensive principle, on which a plan of systematic despotism has been lately
formed in England, and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and care.”13 And he
expressly condemned William Blackstone for advancing and defending this
despotic system.
Wilson rejected this feudal notion of sovereignty on the ground “that
another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms,” in his
judgment, “the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the
pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those,
whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be
found in the man.”14 In other words, obedience must rest on the consent of the
only “sovereign” from which justice and equality rest: the individual person who
is asked to obey the law. “The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by
human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which he
becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which
are formed and authorised by those laws.”15
State governments are simply the product of these very same people,
themselves bound by laws, who have banded together to form a government. As
such, states are as bound by the law as are the ultimate sovereign individuals that
establish them. “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may
not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?
If the dignity of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be
unimpaired.”16
From this Wilson reached the following conclusion about the state of
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Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity against a suit for breach of contract:
A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest
merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of
Justice: Upon general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a
new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a Sovereign
17
State? Surely not.

That this opinion was authored by Justice Wilson is significant. James
Wilson was as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention as any other,
including James Madison. His defense of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania
ratification convention was lengthy and instrumental, and that state’s ratification
set the stage for the Constitution’s eventual adoption in other keys states. Wilson
was also among the most theoretically sophisticated of the founders, as evidence
by his lectures on law given as a professor from 1790 to 1792 at the College of
Pennsylvania.18 Indeed, one reason why his opinion in Chisholm may be
overlooked is that it may seem just too long and theoretical to be a good judicial
opinion.
Wilson was not alone in locating sovereignty in the individual person.
Chief Justice Jay, in his opinion, referred tellingly to “the joint and equal
sovereigns of this country.”19 Jay affirmed the “great and glorious principle, that
the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow citizens
and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their
own Courts to have their controversies determined.”20 Denying individuals a right
to sue a state, while allowing them to sue municipalities, “ would not correspond
with the equal rights we claim; with the equality we profess to admire and
maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes.”21
Neither Wilson nor Jay’s individualistic view of sovereignty fits comfortably into
the notion of popular sovereignty as a “collective” concept.22
17
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Even Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter in Chisholm, did not rest his dissent
on a rejection of the joint and individual sovereignty of the people. Instead, he
devoted the bulk of his opinion to whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
hear a breach of contract case in the absence of expressed authorization either by
the Constitution itself or by Congress. Finding neither, he would have dismissed
the suit. The thrust of Iredell’s opinion, therefore, attempts to avoid reaching the
issue of sovereignty, which he addresses only in passing in what would have been
obiter dictum had his reasoning prevailed.23
Wilson and Jay’s individualistic concept of sovereignty was later
passionately expanded upon by John Taylor in response to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in McCulloch:
I do not know how it has happened, that this word has crept into our political
dialect, unless it be that mankind prefer mystery to knowledge; and that
governments love obscurity better than specification. The unknown powers of
sovereignty and supremacy may be relished, because they tickle the mind with
hopes and fears; just as we indulge the taste with Cayenne pepper, though it
disorders the health, and finally destroys the body. Governments delight in a
power to administer the palatable drugs of exclusive privileges and pecuniary
gifts; and selfishness is willing enough to receive them; and this mutual pleasure
may possibly have suggested the ingenious stratagem, for neutralizing
constitutional restrictions by a single word. . . .24
PUBLIC MORALITY 42 (2006) (“one of the foundational principles of American law — at both
the state and federal level — is residual individual sovereignty”). William Castro has coined the
phrase “the people’s sovereignty” to capture this idea. See William R. Castro, James Iredell and
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In his lengthy treatment of the subject Taylor notes,
Sovereignty implies superiority and subordination. It was therefore inapplicable
to a case of equality, and more so to the subordinate-power in reference to its
creator. The word being rejected by our constitutions, cannot be correctly
adopted for their construction. . . . It would produce several very obvious
contradictions in our political principles. It would transfer sovereignty from the
people, (confining it to mean the right of self-government only,) to their own
servants. It would invest governments and departments, invested with limited
powers only, with unspecified powers. It would create many sovereignties, each
having a right to determine the extent of its sovereignty by its own will. . . . Our
constitutions, therefore, wisely rejected this indefinite word as a traitor of civil
rights, and endeavored to kill it dead by specifications and restrictions of power,
25
that it might never again be used in political disquisitions.

While Iredell would have afforded to states the sovereignty of kings,
Taylor identifies from where kings appropriated the term. “In fact,” he observed,
the term “sovereignty,” was sacrilegiously stolen from the attributes of God, and
impiously assumed by kings. Though they committed the theft, aristocracies and
republicks have claimed the spoil. . . . By our constitutions, we rejected the
errors upon which our forefathers had been wrecked, and withheld from our
governments the keys of temporal and eternal rights, by usurping which, their
patriots had been converted into tyrants; and invested them only with powers to
restrain internal wrongs, and to resist foreign hostility; without designing to
26
establish a sovereign power of robbing one citizen to enrich another.

By omitting Chisholm from the canon, students learn none of this; they are left
unexposed to the radical and fundamental idea that, if anyone is sovereign, it is
“We the People” as individuals, in contrast with the modern view that locates
popular sovereignty in Congress or state legislatures, which supposedly represent
the will of the people.
Another reason for teaching Chisholm is that it represents the “road not
taken” with respect to constitutional amendments. The states and Congress chose
to follow the advice of Justice Blair. “If the Constitution is found inconvenient in
practice in this or any other particular,” he wrote in his opinion, “it is well that a
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regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”27 Precisely because its holding was
reversed two years later by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm
represents an opportunity to consider how the practice of constitutional
interpretation by courts might have been different if the tradition of correcting
Supreme Court decisions by express amendment had taken hold.
As I shall discuss below, there are two possible implications of Chisholm’s
effective “reversal” by the Eleventh Amendment, which reads: “The judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”28 The enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment could mean that the Court had incorrectly interpreted
the Constitution, and the Amendment restores its original meaning. This is the
assumption of modern so-called Eleventh Amendment cases. But the enactment
of the Eleventh Amendment could mean instead that the Supreme Court was
correct in its interpretation of Article III, but the states were unhappy enough with
this implication of the original meaning of the Constitution to successfully have it
amended through the political process.
In either case, if written amendments were seen as a more normal reaction
to a Supreme Court decision, the perceived need for creative “interpretation” by
the Supreme Court itself may have been obviated. The rapid adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment suggests that Article V constitutional amendment can be
practical, provided the legal and political culture views amendments as a natural
response either to a Supreme Court misinterpretation of the Constitution or to a
correct interpretation of our imperfect Constitution with which there is
widespread dissatisfaction.
II. WHY WE NEGLECT CHISHOLM
Before addressing which view of the Eleventh Amendment’s relation to
Chisholm is correct, it is worth pausing for a moment to ask why Chisholm and
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment is usually omitted from the canon—the
set of cases that are almost always covered in the basic course on constitutional
law. I can think of at least three reasons. First, constitutional law is ordinarily
taught doctrine-by-doctrine, rather than chronologically. If one organizes the
27
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course by modern doctrines, there is no obvious or natural place in which to
include Chisholm because “sovereignty” is not among the doctrines normally
taught in either the structures or the rights portions of constitutional law.
By the same token, when teaching modern doctrines, there is no natural
place in which to cover the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,29 which concerns the
meaning of the Fugitive Slave Clause. Even the pivotal case of Dred Scott v.
Sanford,30 does not fit neatly into introductory courses devoted mainly to
structural issues. Were constitutional law taught chronologically, it would be an
open invitation to take up the question that occupied the Supreme Court in its first
major decision: the nature of sovereignty in the United States. And it would be
equally natural to follow the coverage of the Marshall Court’s famous decisions
with the infamous slavery decisions of the Taney Court.
Such an opening sequence conveys to students an entirely different
impression of the subject of constitutional law than does our current organization
that revolves around modern doctrine and typically begins with Marbury. And it
would also make far more meaningful to students both Chief Justice Marshall’s
views on the nature of sovereignty in McCulloch31 and Chief Justice Taney’s
views of sovereignty expressed in Dred Scott.32 In other words, Chisholm is just
the first of several landmark Supreme Court treatments of the nature of
sovereignty, but dropping it from the canon distorts the teaching of this subject by
reading the Marshall Court opinions out of context.33
29
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The second reason we lead with Marbury rather than with Chisholm is
that, until relatively recently, constitutional law professors in the post-Warren
Court era viewed judicial review as an engine of social justice. Although
enthusiasm for judicial review has waned in recent years — as witnessed by the
recent interest in “judicial minimalism,”34 “taking the constitution away from the
courts,”35 and “popular constitutionalism”36 — this recent intellectual trend has
yet to affect the organization of the basic courses in constitutional law. So
judicial review still kicks off most casebooks that were devised years before
interest developed in “the constitution outside the courts.”37
A third reason for omitting Chisholm is that, according to “modern”
Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1880 case of Hans v. Louisiana,38
Chisholm’s view of sovereignty was repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment and,
therefore, the decision itself is a dead letter. Even when the Eleventh Amendment
is included in the basic constitutional law course, it is covered well after Marbury
and Chisholm is usually relegated to a passing footnote in the coverage of the
modern so-called “Eleventh Amendment” cases.
This last reason for ignoring Chisholm will be the subject of the balance of
my remarks. I will contest the modern Court’s claim that the view of sovereignty
it adopted in Chisholm was repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment. Although I
am hardly the first person to question this claim,39 I will explain why a
comparison of the wording of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments undercuts the
Supreme Court’s view that the individualist concept of sovereignty that the Court
in Chisholm relied upon to reach its result was repudiated by the Eleventh
Amendment. Consequently, I join other scholars who have concluded that the
resort, whether the compact made by them be violated. . . .
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modern Supreme Court’s so-called “Eleventh Amendment” line of cases is based
on a faulty reading of the Eleventh Amendment dating back to Hans and is
fundamentally misconceived.
III. WHY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DID NOT REPUDIATE CHISHOLM’S
APPROACH TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
To assess the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and
Chisholm, it is useful to identify clearly the two alternative readings of the
Amendment. First, the Amendment could be read narrowly as simply reversing
the holding of Chisholm that states may be sued by citizens of other states in
federal court. Of course, the Amendment does more than this by also immunizing
states from suits by subjects of foreign nations. That it did so may be significant,
as we shall see. According to this reading, the Eleventh Amendment leaves
entirely intact the underlying individualist concept of popular sovereignty upon
which the Court rested its holding.
The second reading of the Amendment was the one adopted by the
Reconstruction Court in Hans and continues to be accepted by the Court. In
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,40 Chief Justice Rehnquist provided a
concise summary of this position:
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . .
which it confirms.” That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in
Hans v. Louisiana (1890), has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign
entity in our federal system; and second, that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”41

Chief Justice Rehnquist excoriates the dissent for “relying upon the nowdiscredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.”42 Rehnquist affirms the Court’s
conclusion in Hans that the views of state sovereignty articulated by Justice
Iredell in his dissent “were clearly right – as the people of the United States in
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their sovereign capacity subsequently decided”43 when it enacted the Eleventh
Amendment
The modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine, therefore, rests not on the
literal text of the Amendment, but rather on what the Court claims to be its
underlying principle, or what Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to as its
“presupposition.” Chief Justice Rehnquist is quite forthright about this:
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed
at a straw man — we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of
the Eleventh Amendment is [quoting Hans] “to strain the Constitution and the
law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.” The text dealt in terms
only with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm. . . .44

As I have already noted, however, this last sentence is not quite true. The
text of the Eleventh Amendment goes beyond the narrow problem of a state being
sued by a citizen of another state in federal court, and extends as well to suits by
“citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” John Manning finds this to be
significant.
Indeed, so discriminating is the text that it parses a subcategory from amidst the
final head of jurisdiction (“Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects”), leaving untouched suits between a state and
“foreign States” while restricting suits against states by “foreign . . . Citizens or
Subjects.” As a first cut, this fact suggests at least that the Amendment’s
framers carefully picked and chose among Article III, Section 2, Clause 1’s
45
categories to determining what jurisdictional immunity to prescribe.

From this Manning concludes: “The Eleventh Amendment’s careful inclusion and
omission of particular heads of Article III jurisdiction creates at least a prima
facie case that the amendment process entailed judgments about the precise
contexts in which it was desirable (or perhaps politically feasible) to provide for
state sovereign immunity.”46
It is striking that the Court in Hans, and up through today, employed a
version of originalism that has, in recent years, been repudiated by most
43
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originalists: that based on the original intentions of either the framers or ratifiers,
rather than upon the original public meaning of the text they adopted. By
appealing to the principles or “presuppositions” allegedly held by the drafters of
the text in question to override the public meaning of the text itself, the
Reconstruction Court in Hans, perhaps not entirely coincidentally,47 employed the
same version of original intent originalism used by Justice Taney in Dred Scott,
when interpreting the meaning of “the People” in the Preamble as well as the
meaning of the Declaration of Independence.
Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans exemplifies a typical feature of original
intent originalism: its reliance on the counterfactual hypothetical intentions of the
framers.
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own State in the
federal courts, while the idea of suits by citizens of other States, or of foreign
States, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the
Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein
contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens in cases
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that
it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face.48

How similar this sounds to Justice Taney in Dred Scott.49
In his article, Manning defends the narrow interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment by making an important methodological claim about originalisttextualism: Specific constitutional text should be interpreted specifically
according to its terms, and not expanded, contracted, or contradicted by the
purposes (or original intention) for which the text was adopted, or by its
47
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underlying principles. “Given the heightened consensus requirements imposed by
Article V,” he writes,
when an amendment speaks with exceptional specificity, interpreters must be
sensitive to the possibility that the drafters were willing to go or realistically
could go only so far and no farther with their policy. When such compromise is
evident, respect for the minority veto indicates that those implementing the
amendment should hew closely to the lines actually drawn, lest they disturb
some unrecorded concession insisted upon by the minority or offered
preemptively by the majority as part of the price of assent.50

In short, “when the amendment process addresses a specific question and resolves
it in a precise way, greater cause exists for interpreters to worry about invoking
general sources of constitutional authority to submerge the carefully drawn lines
of a more specific compromise.”51
Manning offers three reasons to conclude that the original public meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment was limited to its precise terms. First, “to evaluate
the Amendment’s limited enumeration of exceptions, it is helpful to know the
legal baseline against which the adopters acted.”52 And the most salient
background assumption was the Court’s decision in Chisholm in which four of
five Justices denied the existence, as a general matter, of state sovereign
immunity, and Justices Wilson and Jay specifically “asserted that state sovereign
immunity was flatly incompatible with the premises of our republican form of
government.”53
The Court’s decision in Chisholm, therefore, put before Congress, the
states, and the people of the nation as a whole, a proposition concerning the nature
of sovereignty that, while it may have been implicit in the text of Article III,
might not have been widely apparent. According to the Court, states may be sued
by individuals in federal court to enforce their private contractual rights; their
assertion of immunity from suit based on their sovereignty is inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of Republicanism on which the Constitution rests.
With this issue now unequivocally presented by the decision in Chisholm,
where it had not been before, did Congress respond with an amendment squarely
rejecting the Court’s view of popular sovereignty as resting in the People as
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individuals rather than in the states? It did not. Instead, it responded with a very
narrow, precisely worded, withdrawal of judicial power (or subject matter
jurisdiction) in two specific circumstances.
Would the Eleventh Amendment have been ratified so swiftly, or at all, if
it had been more broadly worded? Manning contends that we can never know the
answer to this question. The wording of the Amendment could well have been a
product of compromise within the drafting process, or have been drafted in
anticipation of potential, but not yet realized, opposition to a broader claim of
state sovereignty. To interpret the amendment more broadly than the language
that was actually proposed and ratified is to run a serious risk of overriding the
desires of either a majority or a potential ratification-blocking minority who
would never have consented to a broader claim of state power. Furthermore, it
may well have been the case that nationalistic Federalists in Congress gave the
states the least they could get away with to mollify them. Again, because we will
never know for certain, we should adhere to the public meaning of the text
actually adopted rather than overriding that text by appealing to some underlying
purpose or principle.
Manning’s conclusion here is worth quoting at length:
Neither Article III nor any other provision of the original Constitution dealt
directly with the problem of sovereign immunity, and American society had no
previous occasion to confront the question squarely, one way or the other.
When dissatisfaction with Chisholm brought the Article V process to bear on
that previously unanswered question, the text that emerged quite clearly went so
far and no farther in embracing state sovereign immunity. Perhaps the resultant
line-drawing merely reflected an inability to secure the requisite supermajorities
for a broader Amendment. But if so, that would be fully consistent with the play
of Article V. Especially in the context of an amendment process designed to
protect political minorities, one cannot disregard the selective inclusion and
exclusion implicit in such careful specification. If American society for the first
time was explicitly confronting the appropriate limitations on potential Article
III jurisdiction over suits against states, one should perhaps attach significance
not only to what the drafters placed in the Amendment, but also to what they
deemed necessary or even prudent to exclude. To do otherwise would risk
upsetting whatever precise compromise may have emerged from the carefully
drawn lawmaking process prescribed by Article V.54

I find Manning’s argument against appealing to underlying purposes to
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expand the specific wording of the Eleventh Amendment to be entirely
convincing. But he fails to consider another possible defense of the Court’s socalled Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Constitutional texts not only have a
literal grammatical meaning in themselves; they also have what Larry Solum has
called “constitutional implicature.”55
These implications can be express
references in the text to concepts, or can be implied affirmances of underlying
assumptions that went unmentioned in the text. Shifting the assumptions
underlying the text as written would be to distort, rather than faithfully adhere to,
the public meaning of the text.
An implication of the text is not the same as its purpose. A piece of text
can have many purposes, and these purposes are largely extra-textual. A
particular provision of a text is very likely to be either under- or over-inclusive of
its underlying purposes, or both. Moreover, while there was a demonstrable
consensus concerning the adoption of a particular wording of a text, there may
have been no comparable consensus about underlying purposes. In contrast, an
implication of the text is a product of its meaning, though it may not be expressed
in so many words. While saying one thing, it may imply something compatible
with, though beyond, what it says. And the original public meaning of the
Constitution might be distorted if this implication is later denied or reversed,
while the specific meaning of the text is preserved.
A good example of constitutional implicature can be found in the Ninth
Amendment, which is also the only other provision of the Constitution to
explicitly provide a rule for how the constitution “shall not be construed.” The
Ninth Amendment reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”56 Read
literally, the Ninth Amendment solely denies a single construction of the text: a
construction that is based on “the enumeration in the constitution of certain
rights.” It’s injunction applies only when the enumeration of certain rights in the
Constitution is offered as a reason for denying others retained by the people.
According to this reading, the Ninth Amendment would have no implication
whatsoever outside the assertion of this specific misconstruction based on the
enumeration of rights.
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Before questioning this claim, it is important to stress that even this
limited reading of the Ninth Amendment as solely a “rule of construction” would
render it extremely important. For it would specifically negate a key claim of the
most important footnote in Supreme Court history that begins: “There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”57 Footnote
Four of Carolene Products is directly asserting that enumeration in the
Constitution of certain “express prohibitions” is reason “to deny or disparage” any
constitutional claims based on “other rights retained by the people.” Even were
the presumption of constitutionality affirmed in Carolene Products simply a
burden shifting presumption, it would disparage the other rights retained by the
people, while not perhaps denying them altogether. But later, in cases such as
Williamson v. Lee Optical,58 the “presumption” was rendered effectively
irrebuttable, resulting in the effective denial of unenumerated rights, until
Griswold v. Connecticut59 came along.
Ironically, it is the New Deal Court’s philosophy of Footnote Four to
which today’s judicial conservative want to return when they disparage the
protection by the courts of any unenumerated rights, as for example did Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Troxel v. Granville.60 “The Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny
or disparage’ other rights,” he wrote, “is far removed from affirming any one of
them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they
might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the
people.”61 Notice Justice Scalia’s rather blithe identification of the legislature
with the people themselves, an equation that was widely rejected at the Founding,
and expressly denied by the Supreme Court in Chisholm.
I want to claim, however, that the Ninth Amendment does more than
expressly reject the construction of the Constitution provided by Footnote Four.
The text of the Ninth implies the existence of other rights retained by the people.
Why? For one thing, it refers explicitly to these “other[]”62 rights. While it does
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not expressly call for the affirmative protection of these rights, the rule of
construction it proposes would make absolutely no sense if there were no such
other rights. Why else would there be an entire amendment added to the
Constitution barring a construction of enumerated rights that would deny or
disparage these other rights? Of course, we have overwhelming historical
evidence independent of the text, that the founders believed that the people
possessed individual natural rights. But the Ninth Amendment adds a textual
affirmation of this underlying assumption of the text that could otherwise be
denied. And the existence of the Ninth Amendment’s reference to other rights
retains by the people is important support for a conclusion that any construction
of the Constitution that results in the denial of these rights would violate the
Constitution’s original public meaning.
Assuming I am right to claim that the rule of construction provided by the
Ninth Amendment implies the protection of other rights that are not to be denied,
what does this tell us about the Eleventh Amendment? One way to reconstruct
sympathetically the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the “presupposition” of state
sovereignty is to claim that it is not relying on the underlying purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment, as characterized by John Manning, but instead on an
implication of its specific text. Just as the Ninth Amendment presupposes the
existence of unenumerated rights, the Eleventh Amendment presupposes the
existence of state sovereignty. This seems to be what the Justice Rehnquist was
getting at when he dismissed a “blind reliance” on the text of the Amendment. A
“blind reliance” would be to limit the text to its terms while denying what it
implies, whether a blind reliance on the text of the Ninth Amendment that limits it
solely to a rule of construction or, with the Eleventh Amendment, to limit it solely
to barring two types of plaintiffs from suing state governments in federal court.
However, a careful comparison of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments
undermines rather than supports Rehnquist’s claim that the text of the Eleventh
implies the rejection of the broad reasoning (as opposed to the narrow holding) of
Chisholm v. Georgia. To begin with, and most obviously, unlike the Ninth
Amendment’s explicit reference to “others retained by the people,” the Eleventh
Amendment contains no explicit reference either to a principle of state
sovereignty or to a doctrine of state sovereign immunity. With the Ninth
Amendment, its injunction against drawing a particular conclusion from “the
enumeration in the constitution of certain rights,” contains within it an expressed
reference to — and therefore an implied affirmation of — the “other” rights
“retained by the people,” coupled with the additional implication that these rights

not be “denied or disparaged.”
To reach a contrary conclusion would require acceptance of the
proposition that there are no other rights retained by the people, or that those that
do exist may be denied or disparaged at the will of the legislature, provided only
that such a denial is not justified on the ground that some rights were enumerated.
But why foreclose this, and only this, justification of denying unenumerated rights
by means of a constitutional amendment? Clearly, the denial of unenumerated
rights was the general evil to be avoided, and the Amendment was included to
guard against a particular source of this evil that was aggravated by the addition
of “the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights.” And the source of this
evil is the foreseeable assertion of the doctrine of expressio unius: to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.
Notwithstanding that the text of the Eleventh Amendment contains no
comparable textual reference to state sovereignty or state sovereign immunity,
would it nevertheless be fair to imply these concepts the text does affirm? I think
not. To see why, let us imagine a hypothetical amendment dealing with
unenumerated rights whose origin would parallel that of the Eleventh. Recall
that, for two years after the ratification of the Constitution, there was no Bill of
Rights, so there was no express prohibition on takings of private property for
public use. Suppose that, during this period, the federal government took land for
the public use of building a post office without making justice compensation to
the property owner. When the owner brings suit for compensation, the
government denies the existence of any such right to compensation.
Now suppose further that, notwithstanding the absence of an express
Takings Clause, the Supreme Court holds that the property owner is nevertheless
entitled to just compensation. The opinions of the Justices are clearly based, first
and foremost, on an extensive analysis of the pre-existent natural rights retained
by the people that no republican government can properly deny or disparage,
including the rights to life, liberty, property, as well as a right to the pursuit of
happiness. One Justice in the majority — call him “Justice Chase” — contends
that “There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which
will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power;
as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof of the government
was established.”63 Textually, the Court grounds its holding on the Necessary and
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Proper Clause, reasoning that a law authorizing a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation was not a “proper” law. A lone dissenter —
call him “Justice Iredell” — protests this reliance on unenumerated rights. In his
words: “It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act
against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a
government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so.”64
This is not entirely hypothetical. It is what the Court eventually did when
it first applied the requirement of just compensation for governmental takings
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[A] statute declaring in terms, without more, that the full and exclusive title to a
described piece of land belonging to one person should be and is hereby vested
in another person, would, if effectual, deprive the former of his property without
due process of law, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Such an
enactment would not receive judicial sanction in any country having a written
constitution distributing the powers of government among three co-ordinate
departments, and committing to the judiciary, expressly or by implication,
authority to enforce the provisions of such constitution. It would be treated, not
as an exertion of legislative power, but as a sentence, — an act of spoliation.
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of
republican institutions. . . . But if . . . a legislative enactment, assuming
arbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it to another
individual, would not be due process of law, as enjoined by the fourteenth
amendment, it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that
amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the state to public use,
and without compensation, of the private property of the citizen. The legislature
may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private
property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made
65
for compensation.

Now imagine that Congress, in direct response to this decision of the
Court, seeks to “overrule” it by enacting a constitutional amendment. Two
versions are proposed. The first reads: “The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to encompass the power to grant just compensations as a
remedy for takings of private property for public use.” The second reads, “This
Constitution shall not be construed to encompass a judicial power to enforce any
right not expressly enumerated herein.” Congress then chooses to propose, and
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the states to ratify, the first rather than the second of these amendments.
One hundred years later it is argued that the version actually adopted
presupposes the general proposition that unenumerated rights are not judicially
protected. Given this sequence of events, would this be a permissible
construction of the amendment actually ratified? Would it be reasonable to claim
that the substance of the second proposed version was implied by adopting the
text of the first? Or would it instead be more reasonable to conclude, first, that
the scope of the amendment actually adopted was limited solely to takings; and
second, that, by adopting the first version rather than the second, Congress
impliedly refused to reverse the broader reasoning of the Court that put the issue
of the right to compensation before the Congress? In other words, unlike the
broader version, the narrowly worded amendment left the broad reasoning of the
Court intact.
Why Congress might have chosen the narrower amendment may be
unknowable.
Perhaps it accepted the Court’s general reasoning about
unenumerated constitutional rights, but rejected its implication for the particular
right to compensation for public takings. Perhaps it disliked the Court’s general
reasoning but was fearful that the more general amendment would get hung up in
the ratification process, and it took what it felt confident it could get. Manning’s
point is that we cannot know for sure everything that might have led Congress to
choose the narrow formulation.
Would it change the analysis if only the narrow version of the Amendment
had been proposed, so that the broader wording was not directly rejected in favor
of the narrower reading? While perhaps reducing our certainty a tiny bit, I think
such a change in the hypothetical does not affect the ultimate conclusion. For in
the hypothetical story that produced the amendment, it was the notorious assertion
by the Court of a general judicial power to protect unenumerated rights that
engendered the controversy. Knowing this, Congress nevertheless addressed just
one application of this more general power. The conclusion remains that
Congress left this judicially-claimed power intact.
The narrowly-drafted words of the Eleventh Amendment were adopted by
Congress in the face of the open denial of state sovereignty affirmed by the Court,
and especially by the opinions of Wilson and Jay. In so doing, Congress turned
away from more broadly-worded amendments. For example, Massachusetts
congressman Theodore Sedgewick initially proposed an amendment reading:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial

courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the
United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens,
or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within
or without the United States.66

But even this sweeping grant of immunity speaks in the jurisdictional terms of
Article III, and concerns the scope of the judicial power, rather than confronting
directly the Supreme Court’s denial of the concept of state sovereignty itself. The
terms of the public debate over Chisholm focused primarily on the “suability” of
states, not on their “sovereignty.”67 It is not clear whether Chief Justice
Rehnquist believed that the Eleventh Amendment should be viewed as a
repudication of the principle that the people and not the states are sovereign; it is,
however, certain that he adduced no evidence that those who proposed and
ratified the Eleventh Amendment did so in order to establish that the perogatives
of state government equaled those of the English King.
CONCLUSION: THE DANGEROUSNESS OF CHISHOLM
Let me conclude by emphasizing what I am not claiming in this essay.
Despite the time I have spent discussing the Eleventh Amendment, this is not a
lecture about its original meaning. A rich and challenging literature exists
examining this issue. Nor am I proposing that we start our teaching of
constitutional law by examining the scope and meaning of the Eleventh
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Amendment, and to abandon the language of state sovereign immunity that
modern courts and commentators frequently use to characterize the Eleventh
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Eleventh Amendment marked a complete Anti-Federalist victory in the battle
over state suability; in truth, the two parties appear to have reached a
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language of state suability, I hope to cabin the influence of this spurious
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Amendment. That would be far too complex for students just beginning their
study of the Constitution to comprehend.
Rather, my only claim about the Eleventh Amendment is to identify a
single meaning it did not have. Contrary to what the Supreme Court now
maintains, the Eleventh Amendment was not a repudiation of the individualist
conception of popular sovereignty articulated by Wilson and Jay. Indeed, I would
submit that the narrow and technical language of the Eleventh Amendment could
not have been understood either as a repudiation of the grand and magisterial idea
that “We the People” are sovereign or as establishing the power of the English
Monarchy as the model of state government authority .
Given all this, I am proposing that it would be far better to begin the study
of constitutional law with the deep issues in Chisholm, as well as with the
importance of constitutional amendments, than to begin our classes with
Marshall’s defense of judicial review in Marbury as has become the custom.
Second, I am not claiming that Congress was affirming the broader
reasoning of the case when it reversed only the narrow holding of Chisholm. John
Manning seems to suggest otherwise,68 and he may well be right. But, for the
present, I am claiming only that the broader principle of state sovereignty to
which Chief Justice Rehnquist referred was not a “presupposition” of the text of
the Eleventh Amendment. So far as constitutional implicature is concerned, the
Eleventh Amendment leaves the reasoning of Chisholm as it was. As such it must
be judged on its merits.
Nor am I claiming in this lecture that the Court in Chisholm was correct in
its conception of popular sovereignty as belonging to the people as individuals
and not to the state or state governments, either as a matter of constitutional
theory or of history. Of course, my sympathies on this subject should be obvious.
That Chisholm was decided so close to the enactment of the Constitution — in
contrast with John Marshall’s opinions or the Court’s decision in Hans — and that
the individualist concept of popular sovereignty was affirmed by the eminences of
James Wilson and John Jay is powerful evidence that “the People” to which the
Constitution refers was indeed an individualistic concept. At minimum, it cannot
be considered anachronistic to attribute so individualist a sense of sovereignty to
the era.
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That “joint-sovereignty” resides in the individuals who comprise the
people is also textually supported by the wording of the Tenth Amendment, which
confirms that all powers not delegated to the general government by the
Constitution are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. If at least
some of the “other” rights retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment
refers belong to individuals, as I believe the evidence shows to be the case,69 it
would be exceedingly odd if “the People” to which the Tenth Amendment refers
are not also individuals. And “the People” is explicitly distinguished from “the
states.” I confess that I am beginning to suspect that the purely collective reading
of “the People” by Akhil Amar and others may well be anachronistic, but to
establish this proposition would require more investigation into the historical
sources than I have yet to attempt.
My only claim with respect to the Eleventh Amendment is that it did not
displace this individualistic concept of the people affirmed by the Court, whether
rightly or wrongly, in Chisholm. Unlike the Ninth Amendment, which makes no
sense whatsoever without presupposing the existence of the very unenumerated
rights to which it refers, the Eleventh Amendment makes perfect sense whether or
not you assume the existence of state sovereignty. It can fairly be read as carving
out of federal jurisdiction suits brought by two types of parties, an alteration in the
jurisdiction afforded by Article III that required a change in the Constitution to
accomplish. At a minimum, the existence of Chisholm and the fact that its
individualist concept of sovereignty were not repudiated by the Eleventh
Amendment elevates this concept to among the contenders for how popular
sovereignty was conceived at the time of the founding.
But putting aside the Eleventh Amendment, the really interesting
challenge posed by Chisholm v. Georgia is its individualist theory of popular
sovereignty. What does it mean to say that the people are “joint-sovereigns”?
This brings me to a final reason why Chisholm is not among the canon of
constitutional law cases of which all learned lawyers must be aware. Chisholm is
ignored for the very same reason that the Ninth Amendment is ignored: it is
simply too radical. Indeed, the individualist popular sovereignty affirmed in
Chisholm is the opposite side of the very same coin as the “other” individual
rights retained by the people affirmed by the Ninth Amendment.70 The fact that
Chisholm was gutted by the very same Reconstruction Court that gutted the
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments because they too were too radical lends
further support to the idea that the concept of sovereignty affirmed in Chisholm
and the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, along with the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
are ignored by the Court because the implications of taking them seriously are so
momentous. And law professors tend to internalize the Supreme Court’s
boundaries on respectable legal argument.
If nothing else, Chisholm teaches that the concept of sovereignty as
residing in the body of the people, as individuals, was alive at the time of the
founding and well enough to be adopted by two Justices of the Supreme Court,
who were also influential framers, and that the bold assertion that states inherited
the power of kings (subject only to express constitutional constraints) was
rejected by four of five Justices. By omitting Chisholm v. Georgia, the first great
constitutional case, from the canon of constitutional law, we have turned our gaze
away from perhaps the most fundamental question of constitutional theory and the
radical way it was answered by the Supreme Court. We have hidden all this from
our students; and by hiding it from our students, we have hidden it from
ourselves.

